Introduction
There is now a large and growing literature analyzing the factors that determine whether entrepreneurs raise venture capital (VC) funding (Hellmann and Puri [2000] ; Burton, Sørensen, and Beckman [2002] ) and the factors that affect the terms of this financing (Gompers [1997] , Kaplan and Stromberg [2002] ). There is much less understanding of how these VC-backed entrepreneurs come to be entrepreneurs in the first place. In this paper, we try to fill this gap by examining the factors that lead to the creation of VC-backed entrepreneurs, a process we term "entrepreneurial spawning."
We contrast two alternative views of the spawning process. In one view, employees of established firms are trained and conditioned to be entrepreneurs by being exposed to the entrepreneurial process and by working in a network of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.
The prolific spawning of entrepreneurial firms by Fairchild
Semiconductors and its descendents is a prominent example of "how entrepreneurial learning and networks may function," as Saxenian [1994] entrants to the semiconductor industry had at least one founder who worked for Fairchild (Braun and Macdonald [1982] ), including Advanced Micro Devices, Intel, and National Semiconductor, almost all of which were based in Silicon Valley.
In this view, individuals already working for entrepreneurial firms, particularly those already backed by venture capitalists and located in hotbeds of venture capital activity-notably Silicon Valley and Massachusetts-may find launching their own venture less daunting than others might. This may be the case for a number of reasons.
First, working in such firms exposes would-be entrepreneurs to a network of suppliers of labor, goods, and capital, as well as a network of customers (Saxenian [1994] ). Because starting a new venture requires suppliers and customers to make relationship-specific investments before it is guaranteed that the venture will get off the ground, networks can be particularly useful in alleviating this chicken-and-egg problem (Hellmann [2002] ).
Second, would-be entrepreneurs learn how to found companies by participating in the entrepreneurial process alongside other, more experienced entrepreneurs. Finally, individuals with a higher taste for risky activities ma y have already found their way to entrepreneurial firms, consistent with the sorting processes hypothesized by Jovanovic [1979] , Holmes and Schmidt [1990] and Gromb and Scharfstein [2002] . We refer to this depiction of entrepreneurial spawning as the "Fairchild view."
An alternative view of the entrepreneurial spawning process is that individuals become entrepreneurs because the large bureaucratic companies for which they work are reluctant to fund their entrepreneurial ideas. The most prominent example of this is Xerox, which developed many of the key technologies underlying the growth of the personal computer, but which failed to commercialize these technologies (summarized in Hunt and Lerner [1995] ). In 1969, Xerox chief executive Peter McColough commissioned the firm's head of research to build a new laboratory to provide the company with the technology to move the firm from being the leading office copier company to being the dominant supplier of information-intensive products (Chesbrough [2002] ). The Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) was formed to house this group in 1970. The firm hired outstanding researchers for this new technical initiative, including physicists, mathematicians, materials scientists, computer system architects, and software engineers. PARC proved to be enormously fertile, inventing such technologies as laser printing, the Ethernet, the graphical user interface, and personal distributed computing.
Despite appeals by PARC leaders to invest in commercializing these innovations, the firm's Rochester, New York-based executives resisted such expenditures. Instead, the vast bulk of the value from these inventions was captured by employees who left Xerox to found companies such as Adobe Systems and 3Com (as well as licensees such as Apple Computer).
There are at least three reasons that large, established firms might be more prone to spawn entrepreneurial ventures. (We will refer to this as the "Xerox view" of entrepreneurial spawning.) First, it may be that firms are incapable of responding to radical technological changes that upset the established ways of organizing their businesses. Christensen [1997] , perhaps the most visible proponent of this view, has written about the failure of companies to capitalize on "disruptive technologies":
Why was it that firms that could be esteemed as aggressive, innovative, customer-sensitive organizations could ignore or attend belatedly to technological innovations with enormous strategic importance? … Finding new applications and markets for n ew products seems to be a capability that each of these firms exhibited once, upon entry, and then apparently lost. It was as if the leading firms were held captive by their customers, enabling attacking entrant firms to topple the incumbent industry leaders each time a disruptive technology emerged (Christensen [1997] , p. 24).
Henderson [1993] presents evidence of the organizational incapacity of firms to respond to technological change. Using data from the semiconductor photolithography industry, she shows that incumbents were consistently slower than entrants in developing and introducing new technologies.
A second, related reason why large, established companies may spawn more is that high-level managers at these firms are incapable of evaluating these entrepreneurial opportunities because they fall outside the company's core line of business. Assessing these opportunities may also require the analysis of "soft information," which hierarchical organizations may have a hard time doing (Stein [2002] ; Berger, et al. [2002] ). Moreover, the internal capital market tends to favor established lines of business over less established, but perhaps more promising businesses (Scharfstein [1998] ; Scharfstein and Stein [2000] ). These arguments suggest that a considerable amount of entrepreneurial spawning should come from large established firms, where these problems are presumably most severe.
Finally, it is also possible that the level of entrepreneurial spawning would be high among these firms not because of any sort of inefficiency at these firms, but rather because these firms wisely choose to focus on their core business or "core competence."
The wisdom of focusing on one's "core competence," has been a mainstay of management consulting since the 1980s. It is also supported by the findings that:
diversified firms tend to trade at a discount to a portfolio of comparable focused firms (Berger and Ofek [1995] ); firms that diversified excessively during the 1960s and 1970s
were more likely to be acquired and broken up in the subsequent two decades; and when firms diversified into unrelated businesses, the productivity of their existing businesses declined (Schoar [2002] ). Thus, in this view, even though good entrepreneurial ideas might be germinated at these firms, management wisely chooses not to develop them because it would do more harm than good to their core businesses.
This paper is an empirical exploration of the Fairchild and Xerox views of the entrepreneurial spawning process. To analyze these perspectives on spawning, we assemble a database of employees who leave public companies to start venture capitalbacked firms during the period 1986-1999. From these data, we are able to calculate the spawning levels of public companies. We then relate these spawning levels to firm characteristics in a cross-sectional analysis and examine how these spawning levels change over time for particular firms.
Controlling for firm size, the patent portfolio, and industry, we find that the most prolific spawning firms from 1986-1999 were public companies located in Silicon Valley and Massachusetts that were once VC-backed themselves.. These effects are substantial:
being located in Silicon Valley increases the spawning level by almost 38%; public companies in Massachusetts ha ve a 23% higher spawning level; and companies that were once VC-backed have a 23% higher spawning level.
Diversified firms appear to spawn less, not more. Firms focused in one segment have spawning levels 19% higher than those operating in multiple segme nts. Moreover, after controlling for the quantity, quality, and originality of patents that firms have in the areas of principal interest to venture capitalists (computers and communication as well as drugs and medical), the existence of other types of patents in the portfolio (e.g., mechanical patents) tends to reduce a company's spawning level. This result is inconsistent with the notion that more diversified firms will spawn more. Our findings appear to be more consistent with the notion that diversified firms are less entrepreneurial and thus less prone to have the sorts of people who would have the inclination, ability, or skills to start new VC-backed firms.
One competing interpretation of our findings is that VC-backed firms in Silicon
Valley and Massachusetts have high spawning levels not because of entrepreneurial learning, networks or attributes, but simply because they have technologies and operate in businesses that are of more interest to venture capitalists in the first place (as, for instance, the tabulations in Kortum and Lerner [2000] suggest). While this remains a possible explanation, it is worth noting that we have controlled extensively for patent characteristics (quantity, class, quality, and originality) and industry. Thus, if high spawners simply function in fields of greater relevance to venture capitalists, they must do so in a way that is neither observable to us nor captured by our patent and industry controls. One could also argue that our finding of high spawning levels among focused firms arises because more of the company's businesses are in areas of interest to venture capitalists. Here, too, one would have to argue that this is true after controlling for industry and patent composition. Of course, the ideal approach would b e to use instruments for the variables of interest, but it is hard to find exogenous determinants of location, prior financing, and focus.
The final empirical section of the paper examines how spawning levels change over time for firms. Thus, we construct a panel of annual spawning levels for firms with patents in areas of interest to venture capitalists. When we use firm fixed effects in our regression analysis, we find that firm spawning levels are lower when a firm's past sales growth is high relative to the firm's mean level of growth. We interpret this finding as indicating that when firms are growing rapidly, employees choose to stay at their firms (and perhaps develop their entrepreneurial ideas internally) because they perceive the rents from doing so to be high. When growth slows, however, employees are more prone to seek entrepreneurial opportunities outside the firm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the construction of the data set and summarizes the data. The analysis is presented in Section II. Section III concludes the paper, discusses some implications of our findings, and highlights other research opportunities in this area.
I. Constructing the Data Set
The core data for the analysis come from VentureOne. VentureOne then collects information about the businesses through interviews with venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. The data collected include the identity of the key founders (the crucial information used here) and the industry, strategy, employment, financial history and reve nues of the firm. Data on the firms are updated and validated through monthly contacts with investors and firms.
For the purposes of this analysis, we examine the founders and initial executive officers (henceforth referred to as "entrepreneurs") that j oined firms listed in the VentureOne database during the period from 1986 and 1999. 1 Typically, the database reported the previous affiliation and title of these entrepreneurs, as well as the date they joined the firm. In some cases, however, VentureOne did not collect this information. In these cases, we attempt to ascertain the information, examining contemporaneous news stories in LEXIS-NEXIS, securities filings, and web sites of surviving firms. 2 We believe this data-collection procedure may introduce a bias in favor of having more information on successful firms, but it is not apparent to us that it affects our analysis. It is not surprising that the venture capitalists would look to finance entrepreneurs with relevant technology experie nce. Table III compares spawning firms to non-spawning firms. We take averages for each company that ever spawned a VC-backed start-up in the VentureOne database during these years: i.e., those that spawned at least one entrepreneur over the time period. We contrast these firms to those that spawned no VC-backed firms. For the purposes of interpreting our later results, we report summary data only on those firms that end up in our basic regression analysis.
The tabulation reveals that spawning firms tend to be significantly larger than nonspawners. For instance, the median spawning firm has 60% higher sales, 90% greater assets, and 170% more employees. Tobin's Q is calculated as the ratio of the market value of the firm to the book value of its assets, following the procedure delineated in Kaplan and Zingales [1997] . Because the distribution of Tobin's Q has a dramatic rightward skew, we report winsorized versions of this measure, cutting off the distribution at a Q of 10, roughly corresponding to the 99 th percentile. The mean Q of spawning companies (2.75) is somewhat higher than the mean Q of non-spawning firms (2.54). The difference in the medians is much larger: 2.18 versus 1.71. The average EBITDA to assets ratio is not appreciably different across the two sub-samples but sales growth is considerably higher among the spawning firms.
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In addition to looking at differences in the financial performance of spawning and non-spawning firms, we also tabulate whether the headquarters of these firms are in Silicon i.e., patents with a primary assignment to category 2, "Computers and Communications," or category 3, "Drugs and Medical," using the classification scheme in the NBER data file.
Finally, the table reports information on the average quality and originality of patents in categories 2 and 3 for these companies. The standard measure of patent quality (see the extended discussion in Jaffe and Trajtenberg [2002] ) is the number of citations the patent receives. We use this citation measure of quality, adjusting for the year in which the patent was granted and the sub-category of the patent. 8 Thus, our quality measure is the firm fixed effect in a regression of a patent's citations on a set of dummy variables for the year in which the patent was granted and the patent sub-category. The table indicates that the average patent quality of spawning firms is higher than that of non-spawning firms.
Recent research (summarized in Jaffe and Trajtenberg [2002] ) has highlighted the importance of the measure of patent originality. A patent is considered more original if it cites patents across more patent categories, as it is more likely to synthesize knowledge across a variety of disciplines. We use this measure reported in the NBER patent database, again adjusting for the granting year of the patent and the patent's sub-category. The table
shows that the average originality of patents held by spawning firms is lower than that of non-spawning firms.
II. Analysis
We present the results here in four sub-sections. We start in sub-section II.A by analyzing the factors that affect the total number of venture capital-backed start-ups that public companies spawn over the entire sample period, 1986-1999. In the next two sub-sections, II.B and II.C, we examine the extensive and intensive margins of spawning--i.e., the factors that determine whether a firm spawns at all and the factors that determine how much spawning a firm undertakes conditional on spawning at least one firm. We then examine in sub-section II.D whether the factors that explain overall spawning levels explain spawning levels on a yearly basis. In this sub-section we also look at the annual spawning levels in a model with firm fixed effects. Thus, we are able in this part of the paper to examine the time-varying characteristics that affect whether a firm's spawning level is above or below its own mean.
A. The Determinants of Total Spawning
In this section, we analyze the factors that affect the total number of venture capital backed companies spawned by public companies during the sample period 1986-1999. One issue that we face from the outset is that some firms will have very little spawning activity simply because they specialize in areas that are of little interest to venture capitalists. Indeed, historically, more than 80% of venture capital disbursements have gone to firms in the information technology and health-related fields. Thus, for the bulk of the analysis, we will restrict our analysis to firms who were awarded at least one patent between 1981 and 1999 in NBER patent categories 2 (computer and communications) or 3 (drugs and medicine), which correspond to areas of greatest interest to venture capitalists.
As the dependent variable, we use the logarithm of the number of venture capitalbacked start-ups that the firm spawns over the sample period (plus the number one to avoid dropping non-spawning firms). When more than one person leaves a given company in a given year to form a particular firm, we still count it as one firm that was spawned. In some of the analyses we look only at spawning of start-ups in technology intensive businesses for which the patents in categories 2 and 3 are most relevant. As shown in Table 1 , these spawned firms account for roughly two-thirds of the companies spawned in a given year.
We start by looking at overall spawning because of our inability to identify the spawning date with certainty for every venture capital-backed company. In many cases, VentureOne does not report the date on which the entrepreneur joined the start-up. In these cases, we tried to fill in this information from publicly available information, but in many of them, we were unsuccessful. When we could not find the information from other sources we used the founding date of the start-up. There are, however, a number of cases in which the founding date of the company precedes the founding date of the public company, indicating that the entrepreneur most likely joined at a later time. These observations are dropped from the analysis when annual spawning levels are analyzed.
This tends to disproportionately reduce the measured spawning levels of young public companies. Of course, looking at overall spawning levels has its own limitations, the most important of which is that it does not allow us to examine the time dynamics of spawning. Since there is no perfect solution to this problem, we analyze the determinants of total spawning levels here and annual spawning levels in sub-section II.D below.
The first column of Table IV reports the results of a cross-sectional regression in which the dependent variable is the log of a firm's total spawning. The mean of this variable is 0.482, indicating that the average firm spawns 0.619 firms between 1986 and 1999. The regressors in this analysis are: (1) the log of the total number of patents the firm was granted between 1981 and 1999 in each of the six NBER patent categories (as described in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg [2001] ); (2) the mean of logarithm of the firm's assets over the sample period expressed in 1996 dollars; (3) the mean ratio of EBITDA to assets; (4) the mean annual growth of real sales; (5) the mean of annual Q; (6) a dummy variable that equals one if the firm was venture capital-backed; (7) separate Silicon
Valley and Massachusetts dummies; (8) the mean of the firm's focus dummy; (9) the quality of patents in categories 2 and 3; and (10) the originality of the patents in categories 2 and 3. Because the firms are in the sample for different numbers of years,
we also include a set of dummy variables for each year the firm is in the sample. The tstatistics are based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors that allow for nonindependence of observation across firms within the same 2-digit SIC code.
Not surprisingly, the coefficients of the patent quantities in categories 2 and 3 are positive and highly statistically significant. The coefficient indicates that the elasticity of spawning with respect to patenting in category 2 is 0.235 and that the elasticity in category 3 is 0.141. It is noteworthy also that this elasticity is less than one; doubling a company's patents generates significantly less than twice as many spawned entities.
There may be several explanation of this. First, not all businesses are based on patents and technological know how; patents may be irrelevant for these spawned entities.
Second, many patents may have no immediate practical business va lue. If larger firms with more patents are more likely to have such patents (perhaps because they have internal patent departments that reduce the cost of applying for patent awards, and thus make it worthwhile to apply for more marginal awards), the incremental impact of a patent on spawning activity could be lower. A third possibility is that some patenting may be an attempt to limit the extent to which employees take their ideas and start new ventures. Finally, to the extent that we have included other measures of size, such as the logarithm of real assets, these variables may be picking up some of the effect of an increase in patenting.
Interestingly, the coefficients on the other four patent categories are all negative and, in the case of mechanical patents (category 5) and other patents (category 6), they are statistically significant. This finding suggests that having research activities outside of the main venture-capital-related areas reduces the level of spawning. This is not consistent with the Xerox view that spawning is a consequence of corporate bureaucracy.
It is, however, consistent with the Fairchild view to the extent that firms operating in multiple areas of research tend to be less entrepreneurial in style and attract a less entrepreneurial type of employee. We discuss this and related findings later in this section.
The table also indicates that firms with more assets spawn more firms, which is not surprising given that the dependent variable is not size adjusted. There is no statistically significant link between spawning and EBITDA over assets, nor with oneyear real sales growth. High Q firms do, however, spawn more. There are many potential explanations for this finding. One plausible explanation is that firms have high Q because they are expected to develop new businesses. The ideas for these new businesses are generated by the firm's employees and some of them may choose to develop the ideas on the outside, backed by venture capital. Silicon Valley, the effect is comparable in size to that of being VC-backed.
The result that venture capital-backed firms spawn more is consistent with the Fairchild view of spawning. In this view, employees of VC-backed firms learn how to be entrepreneurs through the experience of working in an entrepreneurial environment. They may also have greater exposure to the network of suppliers of goods, capital, and labor, as well as customers. And, employees that select into venture capital backed firms may be less risk averse, and thus more willing to accept the risks associated with starting a new company. While it is difficult to determine the precise mechanism through which employment at a venture capital backed firm affects the amount of spawning, the effect is quite strong in the data. The finding does not appear to be consistent with the alternative Xerox view of spawning.
The positive effect of being located in Silicon Valley and Massachusetts is also consistent with the Fairchild view. In both regions, employees have a closer connection to a network of suppliers of goods, capital and labor that is critical to the creation of a new enterprise. Saxenian [1994] argues that being located in a region with other small entrepreneurial firms makes it easier to find companies that are willing to supply critical inputs. She argues that this effect is stronger in Silicon Valley than in Massachusetts because the latter region tends to have larger, more vertically integrated firms. Although we estimate a larger effect in Silicon Valley than in Massachusetts, it would be a stretch to say that we have confirmation of Saxenian's claim.
We also find that a firm's average level of focus is positively related to the extent of its spawning. The estimated effect is also quite large. A firm that is focused throughout the sample period spawns 20% more than a company that is diversified throughout. This finding appears at odds with the view that spawning is a response to bureaucratic rigidities in large, technology-intensive firms. The result appears more consistent with the Fairchild view.
The regression results also indicate that older public companies spawn fewer venture capital backed start-ups. The estimated elasticity of 5.8% is small. Given the imprecision with which we measure firm age, we would not put much stock in the magnitude of this coefficient.
Finally, the regression includes measures of patent quality and originality. Firms with higher quality patents in categories 2 and 3 appear to spawn more, while those with lower average originality appear to spawn less. The coefficient of patent quality is statistically significant, while the coefficient of patent originality is not. An increase from the 25 th percentile of quality to the 75 th percentile, ---an increase of 6.3 adjusted citations ---leads to an increase of 2.8% in the level of spawning, a small effect. Like the age effect, it is hard to put too much weight on the estimated quality effect.
The second set of regressions in Table IV 
B. The Characteristics of Firms that Spawn
In the sample of 1370 companies that patent in categories 2 and 3, 515 companies spawn at least one venture capital-backed firm and 855 spawn none. What are the factors that determine whether a firm spawns at least one firm? To address this question, we report the results of regressing a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm spawns at all on the same set of regressors as those reported in Table IV . Although we report the ordinary least squares estimates in Table V , the logit results are substantively similar.
Not surprisingly, firms with more patents in categories 2 and 3 are more likely to spawn a VC-backed start-up. A firm with only one patent in category 2 (the 25 th percentile of patent quantity) has a 33.5% chance of spawning a VC-backed start-up, whereas a firm with 9 patents in category 2 (the 75 th percentile) has a 54.6% chance of spawning a VC-backed start-up. The estimated effect for patents in category 3 is similar in magnitude. Patenting in the other patent categories-particularly in categories5 and 6-tends to reduce the probability of spawning.
The estimated effects of the critical variables of interest-prior VC backing, location, and focus-are all large and statistically significant. The predicted probability of spawning any start-up is 20.2% higher for VC-backed public companies than for firms that were not venture capital-backed. The empirical model predicts that non-VC-backed public firms have a 33.0% probability of spawning at least one company, while a VCbacked public company has a 53.1% chance of spawning such a firm. The estimated effects are similar in magnitude for firms located in Silicon Valley and Massachusetts.
Firms located outside of either have a 34.7% chance of spawning at least one start-up, while a public company located in Silicon Valley has a 51.2% chance of spawning a start-up and one located in Massachusetts has a 48.4% chance of spawning a start-up.
The estimated effect of the focus variable is somewhat smaller than those of location and prior VC backing.
A firm that is focused throughout the sample period has a 51.8% chance of spawning at least one start-up, while a firm that was diversified throughout the sample has a 43.4% chance of spawning a start-up. In interpreting the magnitude of the focus coefficient, however, one has to keep in mind that the regression also includes the number of patents outside of categories 2 and 3, which also measures the degree of focus.
Indeed, if one excludes the quantity of patents outside of categories 2 and 3, the estimated coefficient of average focus doubles in magnitude and is highly statistically significant in all specifications.
With respect to patent characteristics, patent quality appears to be significantly and positively related to spawning at least one company, while the effect of originality is negative albeit statistically insignificant.
The second column of 
C. The Intensity of Spawning
In this section, we examine the intensity of spawning, conditional on the firm spawning at least one venture capital-financed firm. Table 6 re-estimates the specifications in Table 4 for the 515 companies that spawn at least one start-up. The main difference between the coefficients estimated in Table 4 and those estimated in Table 6 is that, although the estimated coefficient of the VC dummy is positive, its magnitude is small and statistically insignificant. Thus, one might conclude that prior VC backing affects whether a company spawns, but not how much it spawns conditional on spawning.
The estimated effects of location continue to be large, though the coefficient estimate of the Massachusetts dummy is now estimated imprecisely, perhaps because the sample size is so much smaller now. The coefficient of focus is also positive and borderline statistically significant at the 5% confidence level. The estimated effect of quality is also positive and statistically significant. None of these effects change substantially when we restrict the dependent variable to the spawning of high-tech firms (column 2) and add industry dummies (columns 3 and 4).
9 Patent quality in categories 2 and 3 appears to be higher if the company patents little outside those categories. Thus, the negative coefficients of patenting outside categories 2 and 3 may proxy in part for poor patent quality in categories 2 and 3. Excluding the patent quantities in categories other than 2 and 3 increases the coefficient of patent quality, which becomes highly statistically significant.
D. The Determinants of Annual Spawning Levels
In this sub-section we analyze the determinants of spawning on a annual basis.
As discussed above, measuring annual spawning is imprecise given the data we have because in some cases we do not know when the entrepreneur joined the start-up. When we do not have this information, we assumed that it occurred at the founding of the startup. If the start-up is founded before the spawning company goes public, then the observation is dropped from the sample. This means that we tend underestimate to a greater extent the number of spawned entities from companies that have gone public more recently. With this caveat in mind, we present the results of pooled crosssection/time series analysis in Table 7 and a firm fixed effect analysis in Table 8 .
We observe the same basic pattern of results in the first column of Table 7 . Prior Table 7 .
The last column of Table 7 reports the result of the between estimator: regressing firm average annual spawning levels on firm averages of the regressors. This approach is similar to the approach taken in Table 4 , but relies on the more imprecise measure of annual spawning as opposed to cumulative spawning. Although the results are all consistent with those observed in Table 4 , the coefficients are generally more imprecisely estimated in Table 7 . There are two alternative views. On the one hand, spawning may be higher during relatively good times as employees are exposed to more entrepreneurial opportunities.
On the other hand, when growth slows or performance weakens one might expect employees to be more aggressive in pursuing outside entrepreneurial opportunities as the value of remaining at the company falls. Table 8 shows that spawning is unrelated to Q and the EBITDA measure, but it is negatively and significantly related to lagged 3 -year sales growth. The estimated coefficient, however, is small. The model implies that an increase in sales growth from the 25 th percentile to the 75 th percentile, reduces the log quantity of spawning from 0.089 to 0.085, a change of just 4.6%. It is difficult to determine whether the effect is genuinely small or is small because of the significant measurement error in calculating annual spawning levels. In either case, however, the results appear to be consistent with the view that employees leave firms not at the peak of their growth rates, but instead when growth rates have fallen. This is consistent with the view that employees pursue entrepreneurial opportunities outside their firms when the rents from staying at the firm are diminished.
The regression also includes the logarithm of age and the firm focus measure.
Spawning appears to decline as a firm ages; the coefficient is significant at the 10% indicate that high sales growth is associated with less spawning than moderate sales growth and that low sales growth is associated with the more spawning. Though the magnitude of these coefficients are roughly the same, only the coefficient on the high sales growth dummy is statistically significant.
III. Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research
This paper examines the determinants of entrepreneurial spawning, i.e., the propensity of publicly-traded corporations to spawn new venture capital-backed firms.
While entrepreneurial activity has received a tremendous amount of attention from academic researchers and the popular press, the source of new entrepreneurial firms has received relatively little systematic attention. We show that existing public companies These findings appear to be inconsistent with the view that entrepreneurs start new firms in response to their frustration with large, bureaucratic companies. Instead, they suggest that the breeding grounds for entrepreneurial firms are other entrepreneurial firms. It is in these environments that employees learn from their co-workers about what it takes to start a new firm and are exposed to a network of suppliers and customers who are used to dealing with startup companies. These spawning entrepreneurial firms may also implicitly select for less risk averse individuals who are willing to bear the greater risks of starting a new firm.
Our findings have a couple of implications. In particular, they suggest that entrepreneurial activity in a given region has increasing returns (Saxenian [1994] ).
Stimulating entrepreneurship in a region with few existing entrepreneurial firms is difficult; there may be many individuals with the technological know-how to start a new VC-backed firm, but many fewer who know how to start new companies. In addition, the network of suppliers and customers may not be strong enough to support a new venture. 
Table 1 Summary of Entrepreneurs
The sample is based on Venture One's database of 15,297 founders of 5,112 venture capital-backed startups who received venture capital financings from 1986-1999. The previous employment history of the founders is tabulated. Public companies are those identified from Compustat. The third column lists the number of founders who are the CEO, President, or Chief Technology Officer of the startup. The fourth column lists the number of founders whose most recent employer was a public company. 
Year

Number of Entrepreneurs
Number of Startups
Table 2 Summary of Information on Previous Employer of Founders
The sample is derived from public companies listed in Compustat during the period 1986-1999. A spawned entrepreneur is an employee who leaves a public company to start a venture capital-backed firm. Data on founders come from the VentureOne database of 15,297 founders of 5,112 venture capital-backed start-ups during the period 1986-1999. Panel A lists all public companies that spawn at least ten entrepreneurial teams during the sample period, 1986-1999 and the number of entrepreneurial teams they spawn during the sample period. (Multiple individuals departing to a single firm are regarded as a single entrepreneurial team.) Panel B lists all industries in which public companies spawn at least 20 entrepreneurs in total and the number of entrepreneurs they spawn. The sample is derived from public companies listed in Compustat during the period 1986-1999. Spawners are identified as those public companies in which at least one employee left to start a venture capitalbacked firm. Data on founders come from the VentureOne database of 15,297 founders of 5,112 venture capital-backed start-ups during the period 1986-1999. The table compares the characteristics of public companies that spawn at least one entrepreneur during the sample period 1986-1999 (the first three columns) to the characteristics of public companies that never spawn during the sample period (the second three columns). All dollar figures are in millions of 1999 dollars. Patent category 2 refers to computer and communication patents as classified in the NBER Patent Citation Data File and category 3 refers to medical and drug patents. The differences in the means are all statistically significant based on heteroskedasticityconsistent t-statistics that adjust for non-independence of observations of the same firm over time.
Spawners
Non-spawners The table presents regressions of the cumulative spawning rates for firms, conditional on the firms doing any sp awning during our sample period. The sample is derived from public companies listed in Compustat during the period 1986-1999 with patents in either Computer and Communications or Drugs and Medical based on the NBER Patent Database classification scheme. The dependent variable in the regressions is the natural logarithm of the cumulative number of venture capital-backed entrepreneurs spawned over the entire sample period from these public companies. The information on entrepreneurs comes from a sample of 15,297 founders of 5,112 venture capital-backed start -ups in the VentureOne database of venture capital financing who received venture capital financing before June 2000. Independent variables include the natural logarithm of inflation-adjusted firm size; the firm's sales growth over the previous three years Winsorized at the 99 th percentile, Tobin's Q for the firm Winsorized at the 99 th percentile; the natural logarithm of patents in six patent categories, dummy variables indicating whether the firm was backed by venture capitalists, dummy variables indicating if the firm was located in Silicon Valley or Massachusetts, measures for the firm's patent originality the natural logarithm of firm age, and a dummy variable that equals one if the firm reports only one industry segment in Compustat. All regressions include year dummies for each year that the firm is in our sample, though the coefficients are not shown; some include industry fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t -statistics in parentheses adjust for non-independence of observations of the same firm over time. The regression are pooled cross-sectional regressions or the between estimators from fixed effects regressions of annual spawning levels for publicly traded firms. The sample is derived from public companies listed in Compustat during the period 1986-1999 with patents in either Computer and Communications or Drugs and Medical based on the NBER Patent Database classification scheme. The dependent variable in the regressions is the natural logarithm of the number of venture capital-backed entrepreneurs spawned in a given year from these public companies. The information on entrepreneurs comes from a sample of 15,297 founders of 5,112 venture capital-backed start -ups in the VentureOne database of venture capital financing who received venture capital financing before June 2000. Independent variables include the natural logarithm of inflation-adjusted firm size; the firm's sales growth over the previous three years Winsorized at the 99 th percentile, Tobin's Q for the firm Winsorized at the 99 th percentile; the natural logarithm of patents in six patent categories, dummy variables indicating whether the firm was backed by venture capitalists, dummy variables indicating if the firm was located in Silicon Valley or Massachusetts, measures for the firm's patent originality the natural logarithm of firm age, and a dummy variable that equals one if the firm reports only one industry segment in Compustat. All regressions include year dummies, though the coefficients are not shown; some include industry fixed effects. All regressions include year dummies, though the coefficients are not shown; some include industry or firm fixed effects. t Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses adjust for non-independence of observations of the same firm over tim e. The table presents the firm fixed-effects regressions for the sample of publicly-traded spawning firms. The sample is derived from public companies listed in Compustat during the period 1986-1999 with patents in either Computer and Communications or Drugs and Medical based on the NBER Patent Database classification scheme. The dependent variable in the regressions is the natural logarithm of the number of venture capital-backed entrepreneurs spawned in a given year from these public companies. The information on entrepreneurs comes from a sample of 15,297 founders of 5,112 venture capital-backed start -ups in the VentureOne database of venture capital financing who received venture capital financing before June 2000. Independent variables include the natural logarithm of inflation-adjusted firm size; the firm's sales growth over the previous three years Winsorized at the 99 th percentile, the firm's industry sales growth over the previous three years Winsorized at the 99 th percentile and deviations from that industry sales growth over the previous three years Winsorized at the 99 th percentile, Tobin's Q for the firm Winsorized at the 99 th percentile; the natural logarithm of patents in six patent categories, the natural logarithm of firm age, and a dummy variable that equals one if the firm reports only one industry segment in Compustat. All regressions include year dummies, though the coefficients are not shown; some include industry or firm fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consist ent t-statistics in parentheses adjust for non-independence of observations of the same firm over time. 
